NEVER BET against Donald Trump. No politician can defy political gravity like the man whose supporters stormed the Capitol on January 6th 2021, only for him to be re-elected in 2024 with a bigger share of the vote. And yet it is hard to imagine a crisis more precisely engineered to intercept the trajectory of his presidency than his ill-judged, heedless war against Iran. Even a short war will alter the course of his second term. One that lasts months could bring it crashing to earth.
永远不要和唐纳德·特朗普对赌。没有哪位政治人物能像他这样违背政治引力：2021年1月6日，他的支持者冲击国会大厦，而到了2024年，他不仅再次当选，而且得票份额还更高。尽管如此，也很难想象还有什么危机，能像他这场判断失当、轻率鲁莽的对伊战争一样，如此精准地截断其总统任期的上升轨迹。哪怕是一场短暂的战争，也会改变他第二任期的走向；若持续数月，则可能使其轰然坠地。
The reason is that the fight against Iran diminishes Mr Trump’s three political superpowers: his ability to impose his own reality on the world, his remorseless use of leverage and his dominion over the Republican Party. Even without Iran, the potency of these Trumpian strengths was likely to wane after the midterm elections. Wars accelerate change.
原因在于，对伊朗的战争削弱了特朗普的三大政治“超能力”：把自己的现实强加于世界的能力、毫不留情地运用筹码施压的能力，以及对共和党的掌控力。即便没有伊朗因素，这些“特朗普式”优势的威力也很可能会在中期选举之后减弱。战争只会加速这一变化。
Start with Trump v Reality. In politics, the president has shown a remarkable ability to twist facts and, sure enough, he insists that he has already triumphed in Iran. Yet the war tells a truth of its own. Iran’s regime cannot win in any conventional sense. But despite widespread destruction of infrastructure and the assassinations of senior leaders—including the security chief, Ali Larijani—Iran’s regime survives for now and its 400kg or so of near-bomb-ready uranium remains at large.
先说“特朗普对现实”。在政治上，这位总统表现出惊人的扭曲事实能力；果不其然，他坚称自己在伊朗已经获胜。然而，战争自有其不容歪曲的真相。伊朗政权从任何常规意义上说都不可能取胜。但尽管基础设施遭到广泛破坏，多名高层领导人——包括安全负责人阿里·拉里贾尼——遭到暗杀，伊朗政权眼下仍然存续，而且其大约400公斤接近制造核弹标准的浓缩铀依然下落不明。
What is more, Iran is waging its own parallel war against the global energy industry. As it strikes shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the infrastructure of its neighbours, the markets are keeping score. With Brent crude spiking to more than $110 a barrel on March 18th, following an Iranian missile attack on a Qatari natural-gas hub, the regime will conclude that its strategy is working.
更何况，伊朗还在对全球能源产业发动另一场平行战争。随着它打击霍尔木兹海峡的航运以及邻国的基础设施，市场正在据此作出判断。3月18日，在伊朗导弹袭击卡塔尔一处天然气枢纽后，布伦特原油价格飙升至每桶110美元以上；伊朗政权会因此认定，它的策略正在奏效。
If anything, time is on Iran’s side. America and Israel will gradually run out of useful targets to strike from the air, or run low on interceptor batteries to see off Iranian weapons. By contrast, Iran appears still to have plenty of drones. For as long as it restricts traffic in the strait, oil prices will climb and the damage to the world economy will grow.
如果说有什么不同的话，那就是时间站在伊朗一边。美国和以色列从空中打击的有效目标会逐渐耗尽，或者用于拦截伊朗武器的防空拦截系统会逐步见底。相比之下，伊朗似乎仍拥有充足的无人机。只要它继续限制海峡通行，油价就会上涨，对世界经济造成的损害也会扩大。
Mr Trump’s second superpower is leverage. Now that other countries’ leaders have come to expect rough treatment, they are learning how to resist. When the president called on America’s allies to help open the strait, warning that NATO faced a “very bad” future if they refused, they turned him down. He quickly reversed course, pretending he had never needed help.
特朗普的第二项“超能力”是筹码和施压。如今，其他国家的领导人既已习惯了他的粗暴对待，也正在学着如何抵抗。当总统要求美国盟友协助打开海峡，并警告说如果拒绝，北约将面临“非常糟糕”的未来时，他们拒绝了他。随后他迅速改口，装作自己从未需要过帮助。
Likewise, Iran is opposing Mr Trump by accumulating leverage against him. In recent days it has signalled that it will grant safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz to ships from friendly countries—a sign that it means to use access as a bargaining tool. Even if Mr Trump wants to end the war, Iran could continue to fire at ships. If the waterway remains closed until the end of April, the oil price could reach $150 a barrel.
同样，伊朗也在通过积累对特朗普的筹码来与他对抗。近几天来，伊朗已释放信号，表示将允许来自友好国家的船只安全通过霍尔木兹海峡——这说明它打算把通行权当作谈判工具。即便特朗普想结束战争，伊朗也可能继续向船只开火。如果这条水道持续关闭到4月底，油价可能升至每桶150美元。
Given that leverage, Iran may hold out for more than just a return to the status quo before the war. It may ask for sanctions to be lifted, or an American commitment to abandon some bases in the Middle East or to restrain Israel. If recession looms in America and stockmarkets start to fall, would Mr Trump escalate by, say, seizing Kharg island, home to Iran’s export terminals? Or would he buckle?
凭借这种筹码，伊朗在停战条件上或许不会仅仅满足于回到战前现状。它可能要求解除制裁，或者要求美国承诺放弃其在中东的部分基地，或约束以色列。倘若美国经济衰退阴云逼近、股市开始下跌，特朗普会不会选择升级局势，比如夺取伊朗出口码头所在地哈尔克岛？还是会屈服退让？
The answer depends partly on the last of his powers: his hold on his party. Mr Trump was elected on promises to spare voters from war and inflation. So far, 13 American service personnel have died; ground operations inside Iran, to recover that uranium, or on Kharg would put many more in danger. Average prices of petrol and diesel have reached $3.88 and $5.09 a gallon, compared with $3.11 and $3.72 at Mr Trump’s inauguration. Republican support for the war is strong, but softening. A vocal faction of MAGA, notably Tucker Carlson (interviewed on “The Insider”, our video show, this week), talks of betrayal.
答案部分取决于他的最后一种力量：对本党的控制力。特朗普当选时承诺让选民免受战争与通胀之苦。到目前为止，已有13名美国军人死亡；若在伊朗境内展开地面行动，以夺回那些浓缩铀，或在哈尔克岛行动，将使更多人陷入危险。汽油和柴油的平均价格分别已升至每加仑3.88美元和5.09美元，而特朗普就职时分别为3.11美元和3.72美元。共和党人对这场战争的支持仍然强劲，但已开始松动。MAGA阵营中一个声音响亮的派系——尤其是塔克·卡尔森（本周接受了我们视频节目《The Insider》采访）——已开始谈论“背叛”。
In private many elected Republicans are seething (see United States section). Mr Trump’s failure to heed warnings about the Strait of Hormuz is typical of his contempt for strategy and his hubris in thinking he knows better than people who really do. Republicans are now highly likely to lose control of the House in the midterm elections in November. Their chances of losing the Senate too have risen by ten points, to about 50%. The worse the defeat, the lamer a duck the president will be and the less influence he will have over who inherits the party.
私下里，许多共和党民选官员怒火中烧（见“美国”版块）。特朗普无视有关霍尔木兹海峡的警告，正是他蔑视战略、又自负地认为自己比真正懂行的人更高明的一贯表现。如今，共和党在11月中期选举中失去众议院控制权的可能性已非常大；他们连参议院也失守的概率也上升了10个百分点，达到约50%。败得越惨，总统就越会沦为“跛脚鸭”，对由谁继承本党的影响力也就越小。
Were the war to drag on, leading to very high oil prices and tumbling stockmarkets, Mr Trump could seek a way out and look for a win somewhere else—in, say, Cuba. Markets would doubtless register relief if the fighting stopped. But Mr Trump is not in full control of this war. Iran’s attack on the gas hub in Qatar shows it still has cards to play. And even if the fighting ended tomorrow it could take four to six weeks to restore oil production, four to eight weeks to settle oil markets and two months to normalise shipping. The risk of renewed Iranian action would remain. Prices may stay high for months. Every day they do weakens the president.
如果战争拖延下去，导致油价高企、股市暴跌，特朗普可能会寻找脱身之道，并试图在别处捞取一场“胜利”——比如说，在古巴。若战斗停止，市场无疑会对这一缓和作出积极反应。然而，特朗普并未完全掌控这场战争。伊朗袭击卡塔尔天然气枢纽表明，它手里仍有牌可打。而且，即便战斗明天就结束，恢复石油生产也可能需要4到6周，油市恢复稳定需要4到8周，航运恢复正常则需两个月。伊朗再次采取行动的风险依然存在。价格可能数月维持高位；而高位每多持续一天，总统就会更虚弱一分。
Mr Trump’s politics depends on the strength that comes from winning. If he seems a loser, expect him to exact retribution. A weaker president could become a more dangerous one.
特朗普的政治依赖于胜利所带来的强势形象。若他看起来像个失败者，就要料到他会实施报复。一个更弱势的总统，可能反而会变得更危险。
Mr Trump is freest to act abroad. He may abandon NATO. He may cut Ukraine loose to punish Europe. He could bully Latin America in the name of fighting crime and drugs. He may demand money for defending Japan and South Korea. He will be maximalist on tariffs. Even if he does not succeed, that will further erode America’s alliances, to the glee of China and Russia.
特朗普在对外事务上拥有最大的行动自由。他可能抛弃北约；也可能放手不管乌克兰，以此惩罚欧洲；他可能以打击犯罪和毒品之名霸凌拉丁美洲；也可能要求日本和韩国为美国的防务保护付费；在关税问题上，他会采取最强硬的极限立场。即便这些举措未必成功，也会进一步侵蚀美国的同盟体系，让中国和俄罗斯乐见其成。
But Mr Trump is also liable to lash out at home. He has already endorsed the idea of withholding broadcasting licences from media outlets that criticise the war. He wants the Federal Reserve to slash rates, but his war makes that less likely— expect further clashes with the central bank. He could target perceived enemies or send immigration agents to more Democratic-run cities. He could threaten to meddle in the midterms, either as theatre to rile his opponents, or because he intends to influence the results. It is hard to see how Mr Trump ends up a winner in Iran. Be warned: he makes a very bad loser. «
但特朗普也很可能在国内发作。他已经赞同这样一种想法：对批评这场战争的媒体机构吊销广播执照。他希望美联储大幅降息，但他的战争使这件事更不可能发生——可以预料，他与央行还会进一步冲突。他可能打击他眼中的敌人，或者把移民执法人员派往更多由民主党执政的城市。他还可能威胁干预中期选举，不论只是为了煽动对手、做做姿态，还是因为他确实打算影响选举结果。很难看出特朗普最终如何能在伊朗问题上成为赢家。务必警惕：他是个极其糟糕的失败者。